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2082273791021571c410f41d565d0b45-Supplemental-Conference.pdf
Privacy Assessment on Reconstructed Images: Are Existing Evaluation Metrics Faithful to Human Perception? In Section 4.1, we briefly introduced how humans annotate the reconstructed images for different Figure 1 displays the GUI, where (A) and (B) were specifically designed for annotating different datasets. To minimize the influence of subjective bias, we use a relatively objective formulation: whether the reconstructed image can be correctly labeled. Figure 2. It can be observed that when We think there are two potential reasons for this observation. Table 1 provides detailed information about these models.
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ProPILE: Probing Privacy Leakage in Large Language Models
The rapid advancement and widespread use of large language models (LLMs) have raised significant concerns regarding the potential leakage of personally identifiable information (PII). These models are often trained on vast quantities of web-collected data, which may inadvertently include sensitive personal data. This paper presents ProPILE, a novel probing tool designed to empower data subjects, or the owners of the PII, with awareness of potential PII leakage in LLM-based services. ProPILE lets data subjects formulate prompts based on their own PII to evaluate the level of privacy intrusion in LLMs. We demonstrate its application on the OPT-1.3B
Privacy Assessment on Reconstructed Images: Are Existing Evaluation Metrics Faithful to Human Perception?
Hand-crafted image quality metrics, such as PSNR and SSIM, are commonly used to evaluate model privacy risk under reconstruction attacks. Under these metrics, reconstructed images that are determined to resemble the original one generally indicate more privacy leakage. Images determined as overall dissimilar, on the other hand, indicate higher robustness against attack. However, there is no guarantee that these metrics well reflect human opinions, which offers trustworthy judgement for model privacy leakage. In this paper, we comprehensively study the faithfulness of these hand-crafted metrics to human perception of privacy information from the reconstructed images.
PrivAuditor: Benchmarking Data Protection Vulnerabilities in LLM Adaptation Techniques
Large Language Models (LLMs) are recognized for their potential to be an important building block toward achieving artificial general intelligence due to their unprecedented capability for solving diverse tasks. Despite these achievements, LLMs often underperform in domain-specific tasks without training on relevant domain data. This phenomenon, which is often attributed to distribution shifts, makes adapting pre-trained LLMs with domain-specific data crucial. However, this adaptation raises significant privacy concerns, especially when the data involved come from sensitive domains. In this work, we extensively investigate the privacy vulnerabilities of adapted (fine-tuned) LLMs and benchmark privacy leakage across a wide range of data modalities, state-of-the-art privacy attack methods, adaptation techniques, and model architectures. We systematically evaluate and pinpoint critical factors related to privacy leakage. With our organized codebase and actionable insights, we aim to provide a standardized auditing tool for practitioners seeking to deploy customized LLM applications with faithful privacy assessments.